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INTRODUCTION
On August 20, 2010, Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli
issued two official opinions: one to Ralph K. Smith, a member of the
Virginia Senate, and the other to Robert G. Marshall, a member of the
Virginia House of Delegates.1 Both opinions answered similar ques-
tions posed by the two members of the Virginia General Assembly:
whether the Commonwealth of Virginia can regulate clinics that per-
form first-trimester abortions, and, if so, to what extent the Common-
wealth can regulate those clinics.2 After referencing a challenge to
South Carolina’s administrative regulations regarding abortion clinics
that essentially placed the clinics on the same level of state regulation
as hospitals (including regulation of staffing rules, equipment and
laboratory availability, maintenance, and design and construction
standards),3 Attorney General Cuccinelli concluded that the Common-
wealth of Virginia could issue similar regulations for abortion clinics,
1. 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 10-012 (Aug. 20, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Op. Va. Att’y
Gen. No. 10-012], available at http://www.oag .state.va.us/Opinions and Legal Resources
/OPINIONS/2010opns/10-067-Marshall.pdf; 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 10-012 (Aug. 20,
2010), available at http://www.oag.state.va.us /Opinions and Legal Resources/OPINIONS
/2010opns/10-012 (Smith) - Marshall version.pdf. Senator Ralph K. Smith and Delegate
Robert G. Marshall received identical letters from Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli..
2. 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 10-012, supra note 1, at 1.
3. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 159–62 (4th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001).
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so long as the regulations complied with Roe v. Wade’s4 constitu-
tional requirements.5 Attorney General Cuccinelli’s stated intent
was to protect women from the risks of abortion.6 These risks, though
present, are uncommon.7 After Attorney General Cuccinelli issued
his opinions, Delegate Marshall wrote a letter to Virginia Governor
Robert McDonnell, requesting that the Virginia Governor imple-
ment Attorney General Cuccinelli’s regulations on abortion clinics.8
The media quickly responded to Attorney General Cuccinelli’s
opinions.9 The response was varied, but for the most part, the response
was negative.10 Newspapers cited the practical effect of such regula-
tions: that they will effectively shut down the majority of abortion
clinics not only in Richmond, the state capitol, but also throughout
the Commonwealth.11
Notwithstanding the negative press, the Virginia General
Assembly quickly went to work. In March 2011, just seven months
after Attorney General Cuccinelli’s advisory opinions, the General
Assembly passed, and Governor McDonnell signed, Senate Bill 924
into law.12 This Bill amended the portion of the Virginia Code that gov-
erned the licensing of hospitals.13 Medical facilities in which five or
more first-trimester abortions are performed are now categorized as
a “hospital.”14
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
5. 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 10-012, supra note 1, at 7.
6. Id. at 4; Tammie Smith, Two of Area’s Three Abortion Clinics at Risk, RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 2010, at A1 (citing Robert G. Marshall, member of the Virginia
House of Delegates).
7. Of first-trimester abortions (the kind of abortions that Attorney General Cuccinelli
is referring to in his opinions), only one-half of one percent result in complications requir-
ing any kind of hospitalization or surgery. A. Barton Hinkle, Where’s the Crying Need to
Regulate Abortion Clinics?, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 2010, available at http://
www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2010/08/31/4984225.htm.
8. Anita Kumar, Va. Allowed to Toughen Abortion Clinic Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
2010, at A4.
9. Matthew Cella, Cuccinelli: Virginia Has Right to Regulate Abortion Clinics,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/23/cuccinelli
-virginia-regulate-abortion-clinics/; Hinkle, supra note 7; Kumar, supra note 8; Smith,
supra note 6; Julian Walker, S. Carolina Law Gives Glimpse of New Abortion Clinic Rules,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 29, 2010, http://hamptonroads.com/2010/08/s-carolina-law-gives
-glimpse-new-abortion-clinic-rules-va [hereinafter Walker, New Abortion Clinic Rules];
Julian Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion Clinics, Cuccinelli Says in Opinion, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Aug. 24, 2010, http://hamptonroads.com/2010/08/va-can-regulate-abortion-clinics
-cuccinelli-says-opinion [hereinafter Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion Clinics].
10. Cella, supra note 9; Hinkle, supra note 7; Kumar, supra note 8; Smith, supra note
6; Walker, New Abortion Clinic Rules, supra note 9; Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion
Clinics, supra note 9.
11. Kumar, supra note 8; Smith, supra note 6.
12. S.B. 924, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011).
13. Id.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B)(1) (2011).
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These facilities were previously treated like doctors’ offices.15 Be-
cause of the new classification of first-trimester abortion clinics, this
bill now puts the Virginia Board of Health in charge of promulgating
regulations to govern them.16 This is the first time in two decades that
the Board of Health has regulated abortion clinics.17
Generally, the Board of Health takes up to two years to imple-
ment regulations.18 In this situation, the General Assembly gave the
Board of Health less than half of that time: only 280 days.19 As a
result, state officials “rush[ed]” 20 to implement the new “emergency
regulations.” 21 No reason was given for the short and strict time
limit.22 In the six months before introducing the regulations, the
Board of Health researched abortion clinic regulations in twenty-
two different states.23 The regulations that were drawn up by the
Board are modeled on the South Carolina abortion clinic regulations,
mostly because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has already
upheld them.24
On September 15, 2011, the Virginia Board of Health debated and
passed the new regulations at their quarterly meeting.25 There were
only four-and-a-half hours of debate before the regulations were put
to a vote.26 Because of their classification as “emergency regulations,”
they were not subject to the normal process of public comment and
review; instead, the Board heard from only thirty-two speakers.27
15. Lena H. Sun & Anita Kumar, Virginia Officials Prepare to Release Draft Abortion
Regulations, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics
/virginia-officials-prepare-to-release-draft-abortion-regulations/2011/08/25/gIQAHFoheJ
_story.html.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127 (2011).
17. See Anita Kumar & Lena H. Sun, Draft Regulations for Va. Abortion Clinics Could
Lead Some to Close, Operators Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.washington
post.com/local/dc-politics/draft-regulations-for-va-abortion-clinics-could-lead-some-to-close
-operators-say/2011/08/26/gIQAapB8gJ_story.html.
18. Anita Kumar, Stricter Va. Rules on Abortion Gain, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2011,
at B1.
19. S.B. 924, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011).
20. Kumar, supra note 18.
21. David Sherfinski, Op-Ed., Virginia Board OKs Stiff Rules for Abortion Clinics,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/15/va-board
-hears-heated-testimony-abortion-regulatio/?page=all.
22. See id. (stating no reason for the 280 day enactment requirement).
23. Prue Salasky, Board Approves Tougher Abortion Clinic Regulations, DAILY PRESS
(Hampton Roads), Sept. 16, 2011, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Kumar, supra note 18.
27. Sherfinski, supra note 21. One doctor who specialized in women’s health called the
hearing “a kangaroo court where standard regulatory processes [were] cast aside.” Wendy
Klein, Va. Board of Health’s ‘Kangaroo Court,’ DAILY PRESS (Hampton Roads), Sept. 19,
2011, http://articles.dailypress.com/2011-09-19/news/dp-oped-klein-00917-20110919_1
_patient-safety-health-centers-health-hearing.
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During this time, eighteen amendments were suggested, but all except
for three were rejected.28 One of the rejected proposals suggested that
the Board of Health distinguish between medical abortions, in which
patients take a pill that causes abortion, and surgical abortions.29
Many of the suggested changes were rejected because it was said that
they went beyond the authority that had been given to the Board.30
Following the discussion at the meeting, the Board of Health
voted twelve to one in favor of the regulations.31 They have already
been called “some of the toughest in the nation.” 32 One of the regu-
lations allows a representative from the Office of Licensure and
Certification to enter and inspect abortion clinics unannounced.33
While there, the representative has access to all records, including
medical records.34 If, at the time of entry, no one is present who is
authorized to provide the representative with the medical records,
then an authorized person must arrive at the clinic within an hour.35
The regulations also require that each abortion clinic create a gov-
erning body and enact bylaws.36
Because the regulations were not passed in the way that regu-
lar, non-emergency regulations usually are,37 they are not final at
this time. Before these regulations go into effect, they must be ap-
proved by both the Attorney General’s office and by the Governor.38
They are expected to go into effect in January of 2012.39 After that,
the Board of Health returns to the drawing board to create per-
manent regulations.40
This Note explores the implications of Attorney General
Cuccinelli’s official advisory opinions and the regulations of the
Virginia Board of Health that occurred as a result of his opinions.
It begins with an overview of background information necessary to
understand the consequences of Attorney General Cuccinelli’s opin-
ions, considering past and current Virginia regulation of abortions
28. Salasky, supra note 23.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Kumar, supra note 18.
33. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-412-100, 110 (2012).
34. Id. § 5-412-110(B).
35. Id. § 5-412-110(C).
36. Id. § 5-412-140.
37. See Kumar, supra note 18.
38. Hugh Lessig, Reaction Mixed to New Abortion Rules, DAILY PRESS (Hampton
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and an overview of the regulations in South Carolina, including
the case upholding their regulations: Greenville Women’s Clinic v.
Bryant.41 It then continues with a discussion of whether the regula-
tion of abortion clinics in Virginia would be constitutional under the
standards currently in place under Planned Parenthood v. Casey.42
After concluding that such regulations would be constitutional, in the
same way that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found the South
Carolina regulations in Greenville Women’s Clinic to be constitutional,
this Note explores the practical effects that such regulations would
create in Virginia if they were put into place. Those practical effects
include the lack of availability of abortion clinics and the increased
costs of abortion that would be passed on to women. Ultimately, this
Note concludes that although regulations imposing restrictions on
first-trimester abortion providers would most likely be held constitu-
tional in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the negative practical
effects of implementing such stringent regulations on first-trimester
abortion clinics outweigh any positive effect that those regulations
would have on the safety of a woman undergoing an abortion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Effects of Official Opinions of the Virginia Attorney General
These regulations began as a result of Attorney General
Cuccinelli’s advisory opinions in August 2010. The Attorney General
has the ability to issue advisory opinions on various legal issues
when requested in writing by one of many members of the state
government.43 Governors, members of the General Assembly, judges,
Commonwealth’s Attorneys, court clerks, sheriffs, and heads of a state
board or department can request advisory opinions from the Attorney
General.44 Unless the opinion is requested by the Governor or a
member of the General Assembly, the subject of the question must
be directly related to the duties of the official making the request.45
The opinions issued by the Attorney General are advisory opin-
ions and carry no binding force, in contrast to the opinions of a court
41. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 175 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1191 (2001).
42. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-505(A) (2010).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 2.2-505(B).
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of law.46 They simply represent what the Attorney General believes
is the present state of the law based on a review of currently existing
law.47 This understanding can be based on any source of law, including
statutes, court opinions, and federal and state constitutions.48 Because
advisory opinions have no binding force, the Board of Health’s regu-
lations did not have to follow Attorney General Cuccinelli’s opinion,
and he could not have required the Board of Health to enact them.
B. Past and Current Virginia Regulation of Abortion Clinics
Although Virginia has a long history of regulating abortion, that
regulation has not endured many changes.49 The first abortion statute,
enacted in 1848, prohibited abortion altogether unless it was done to
preserve the life of the mother.50 If the abortion was performed before
quickening,51 it was a misdemeanor, but if it was performed after
quickening, it was a felony.52 Within fifty years, Virginia eliminated
the distinction made at quickening, and all abortions were classified
as felonies unless they were performed “in good faith, with the in-
tention of saving the life of [the pregnant] woman or [her unborn]
child.” 53 This remained the law until Virginia enacted a version of the
Model Penal Code, which prohibited abortion unless performed in a
hospital and done to protect the life or health of the mother, unless
the child would be born with mental or physical defect, or unless the
pregnancy was a result of rape or incest.54 Following Roe, Virginia
modified its abortion statute to adopt the trimester framework ex-
pressed in the court opinion.55 This is the current state of Virginia’s
abortion legislation.56
There are different requirements and prohibitions on preg-
nant women and abortion providers depending on the trimester of
46. Kumar, supra note 8, at A4.
47. Id.
48. Official Opinions, KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, ATT’Y GEN. OF VA., http://www.oag.state
.va.us/Opinions and Legal Resources/OPINIONS/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
49. PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BY-
STATE ANALYSIS 533–38 (2008).
50. Id. at 537 (citation omitted).
51. Quickening is the first recognizable movement of a fetus in the uterus, which
usually occurs between the sixteenth and eighteenth week of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973) (citation omitted).
52. LINTON, supra note 49, at 537.
53. Id. at 537–38 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 533–34 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 538.
56. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-73 (2010) (second-trimester abortions); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-74 (2010) (third-trimester abortions).
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pregnancy.57 Notwithstanding any of the statutory requirements,
a licensed physician can perform an abortion when, in his or her
professional opinion, doing so is necessary to save the life of the
pregnant woman.58 This is true in any trimester of pregnancy.59
A pregnancy in the third trimester can only be aborted if the
mother’s physician and two other physicians (all three licensed by
the Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery) certify that,
in their medical opinion, the “continuation of the pregnancy is likely
to result in the death of the woman or substantially and irremediably
impair the mental or physical health of the woman.” 60 There is no
provision about the health of the child.61 Additionally, the abortion
must be performed in either “a hospital licensed by the Virginia
State Department of Health [or in a hospital that is] operated by the
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services.” 62
If the fetus is viable after the procedure, measures for life support
must be present and utilized.63
The requirements for abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy are less stringent than those for abortions during the third
trimester.64 Like third-trimester abortions, second-trimester abortions
must be performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department
of Health or operated by the Department of Behavioral Health and
Departmental Services.65 All second-trimester abortions must be per-
formed by a physician licensed by the Board of Medicine to practice
medicine and surgery.66 There is no requirement that continuation of
the pregnancy cause serious physical harm to, or death of, the mother
in order for a physician to be able to perform the procedure, nor does
it require three separate physicians to examine the woman before the
procedure, as the requirements for third-trimester abortions dictate.67
There is also no requirement for life support procedures to be present
and utilized if there is a chance of viability of the fetus.68 The only
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-73 (2010) (second-trimester abortions); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-74 (2010) (third-trimester abortions).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.1 (2010).
59. Id. § 18.2-72 (first-trimester abortions); id. § 18.2-73 (second-trimester abortions);
id. § 18.2-72-4 (third-trimester abortions).
60. Id. § 18.2-74(b).
61. See id. § 18.2-72-4 (2010) (listing abortion procedures for the third trimester with
no mention of the health of the child).
62. Id. § 18.2-74(a).
63. Id. § 18.2-74(c).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-73 (2010).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 18.2-74.
68. Id. § 18.2-73.
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substantive requirements for second-trimester abortions are that
the doctor performing the procedure is licensed and that the proce-
dure be performed in a licensed hospital.69
Abortions performed in the second and third trimesters are regu-
lated by statutes passed by the General Assembly and signed into law
by the Governor,70 however, first-trimester abortions are not regu-
lated in the same way.71 The only provision in the Virginia Code re-
garding first-trimester abortions is the one that specifically makes
them legal when performed by a licensed physician.72 Before Attorney
General Cuccinelli’s advisory opinions, the Virginia General Assembly
had passed no provisions regarding the regulation of first-trimester
abortions.73 The main restrictions of first-trimester abortions are the
licensing requirements that the Virginia Board of Health has imposed
for all doctors:74 the physician performing an abortion is the one who
is responsible for a “diagnosis of pregnancy,” 75 and the abortion pro-
vider must counsel patients and instruct them about abortion proce-
dure and methods of birth control.76
In the Commonwealth of Virginia, it is a Class 4 felony for a
physician to perform any abortion in violation of the statutory and
administrative requirements.77 There are six different classes, or
levels of punishment, for felonies in Virginia.78 Class 4 felonies are
punishable by imprisonment ranging from two to ten years, and a
fine of no more than $100,000.79 If a natural person, the physician,
is charged with a violation of an abortion regulation, he or she is sub-
ject to either imprisonment alone or both imprisonment and a fine.80
An individual physician must be imprisoned and cannot be punished
with just a fine.81 However, if a legal person (not a natural person),
such as a hospital or abortion clinic, is charged with such a crime,
the court can only impose a fine.82
69. Id.
70. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-73 (2010) (regulating second-trimester abortions); id.
§ 18.2-74 (regulating third-trimester abortions).
71. Id. § 32.1-127.
72. Id. § 18.2-72.
73. Cella, supra note 9.
74. 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 85-20-120 to -122, 140 (2011).
75. Id. § 5-410-1270(D).
76. Id. § 5-410-1270(E).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71 (2010).
78. Id. § 18.2-09.
79. Id. § 18.2-10(d).
80. Id. § 18.2-10(g).
81. Id. However, this likely does not prohibit some alternative sentencing options, such
as suspended sentences.
82. Id.
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Physicians, hospitals, and other medical facilities are not required
to admit a patient for the purpose of performing an abortion.83 This
is commonly referred to as a “[c]onscience clause.” 84 Any medical pro-
fessional who submits, in writing, an objection to abortions in general,
or to any specific “abortion[ ] on personal, ethical, moral or religious
grounds,” is not required to participate in the abortion.85 Medical pro-
fessionals or medical facilities that invoke the conscience clause are
exempt from any claim of damages resulting from their refusal to per-
form an abortion.86
It is interesting to note that in the Virginia Code, all provisions
regarding abortion are included in Title 18.2, the criminal section.87
Other medical requirements are located in Title 32.1, Health, if they
are in the Virginia Code, or in the Administrative Code of Virginia.88
The Virginia General Assembly has clearly shown their feelings
about abortions by including abortion regulations in the criminal
code, rather than in the portion of the Virginia Code that deals with
health issues.89
Attorney General Cuccinelli’s advisory opinions are not the
first Virginia Attorney General advisory opinions to deal with the
Commonwealth’s abortion regulations.90 Immediately after the United
States Supreme Court’s Roe decision, members of the Virginia legisla-
ture became concerned about the possibility of abortion restrictions
in the Commonwealth being declared unconstitutional.91 At the time,
Virginia law dictated that all abortions be performed in hospitals.92
The Attorney General at the time, Andrew Miller, believed that the re-
quirement was overbroad in that it included first-trimester abortions.93
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2010).
84. Id.; Vicki Alexander, The Future of Reproductive Rights, in REFLECTIONS AFTER
CASEY: WOMEN LOOK AT THE STATUS OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA 3, 3 (Dorothy
M. Zellner & Nancy Scerbo eds., 1993) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS AFTER CASEY].
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2010).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 18.2-71 (2011) (listing the regulations passed by the Virginia legislature re-
garding abortion which are located in Title 18.2, Crimes and Offenses Generally, Chapter 4,
Crimes against the Person, Article 9, Abortion).
88. Regulations made by the Board of Health are in the Administrative Code. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-127 (2011); 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 85-20-120 (2011) (regulating medical
requirements through the Code of Virginia and the Virginia Administrative Code).
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71 (2011).
90. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA:
FROM JULY 1, 1972 TO JUNE 30, 1973 2–4 (1973) [hereinafter OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL].
91. See id. at 1 (questioning the Virginia conscience clause which does not require hos-
pitals to admit patients for abortions, nor doctors to perform abortions); id. at 2 (question-
ing Virginia abortion laws, which at the time required that all abortions be performed in
a hospital, under the United States Supreme Court’s Roe decision).
92. Id. at 3–4 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1(b) (1973)).
93. Id. at 4.
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He stated that “the result [of this opinion] is that the decision rests
with the physician as to where he wishes to perform the procedure.” 94
The 1973 Attorney General opinion indicates that there was a
point in Virginia history at which the Attorney General believed that
the Commonwealth could not require that first-trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital and could not impose hospital-like regulations
on abortion clinics. This opinion is directly contrary to the current
opinion of Attorney General Cuccinelli. Still, one must remember that
these opinions are only advisory and do not create law.95 Unlike court
decisions, they do not have binding force,96 so any reference to such an
opinion in a court is likely to be dismissed. Attorney General Miller’s
opinion was also made immediately after the Roe decision.97 As dis-
cussed below, the trimester test from Roe has been replaced with a
broader “undue burden” test by Casey.98 The two attorney generals
from different times obviously disagree about the constitutionality
of the regulations,99 but the different controlling constitutional tests
at the time could be responsible for this difference in opinion.
C. South Carolina Regulation of Abortion Providers, Including
Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant
South Carolina health laws are seemingly more involved than
those that were in place in Virginia; an entire Chapter of the South
Carolina Code is devoted specifically to abortion.100 South Carolina
defines abortion as:
the use of an instrument, medicine, drug, or other substance or
device with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known
to be pregnant for reasons other than to increase the probability
of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child after live
birth, or to remove a dead fetus.101
Instead of making an exception for abortion procedures performed
for the purpose of saving a pregnant woman’s life, as Virginia has
94. Id.
95. Kumar, supra note 8.
96. Id.
97. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 90, at 1.
98. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
99. Compare 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 10-012, supra note 1 (declaring that regulations
on abortion clinics that would regulate them in a way similar to hospitals is constitutional),
with OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 90, at 2 (declaring that a regulation
that requires first-trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals is unconstitutional).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41 (2010).
101. Id. § 44-41-10.
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done,102 the South Carolina Code exempts such procedures from the
definition of abortion altogether.103
Similar to Virginia, South Carolina separates abortions into tri-
mesters and has different requirements for each trimester.104 The
South Carolina abortion regulations build upon each other, in that
each trimester has stricter regulations, but includes the regulations
for the previous trimester.105 Statutorily, abortion is legal in the first
trimester if performed by a licensed physician with the consent of the
pregnant woman and the abortion is in the physician’s “professional
medical judgment.”106 The South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control (SCDHEC) then has the power to license and
certify facilities in which abortions are performed.107 The regulations
instituted by the SCDHEC are very detailed and concise.108 They in-
clude requirements for licensing, administration, record keeping,
training and supervision of all employees (not just those directly in-
volved in the procedure), patient admissions criteria, drug storage,
laboratories, emergency care, utensils that must be kept in each pro-
cedure room, storage of medical records and reports, periodic staff
meetings, maintenance of the building, laundry, housekeeping, and
design and construction of buildings.109 These regulations are so de-
tailed that they require abortion clinics to have mandatory fire drills
every three months and to keep outside areas free of weeds.110
In South Carolina, abortions in the second trimester of preg-
nancy must be performed in a hospital or a clinic that is certified by
the SCDHEC.111 Abortions performed in the third trimester have
many additional requirements. Notably, the abortion must be per-
formed in a hospital.112 If the pregnant woman is married and living
with her husband, the husband must consent to the abortion.113 The
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.1 (2010).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(a) (2010).
104. Id. § 44-41-20.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 44-41-20(a).
107. Id. § 44-41-70.
108. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-12 (2010).
109. Id.
110. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d. 691, 703 (D.S.C. 1999), rev’d,
222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
111. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(b) (2010).
112. Id. § 44-41-20(c).
113. Id. The United States Supreme Court declared a similar requirement unconstitu-
tional when the requirement applied to all trimesters of pregnancy. Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837, 844 (1992). The South Carolina legislation would
likely be distinguished because it applies only in the third trimester, as opposed to through-
out pregnancy, and thus the state has a strong interest in the potentiality of human life
and can go so far as to prohibit abortion except in cases where the pregnancy “endanger[s]
the woman’s life or health.” Id. at 846.
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abortion must be necessary to “preserve the life or health of the
woman,” as certified in writing, based upon the medical judgment of
two physicians, the attending physician and a consulting physician,
who are not related, and who are not engaged in private practice
together.114 If the reason for the abortion is to preserve the mental
health of the woman, an additional certification is required from a
psychiatrist who is not related to or engaged in private practice with
the attending physician.115
Similar to Virginia, South Carolina has a conscience clause, which
allows hospitals and clinics to refuse to admit patients for the pur-
pose of an abortion and exempts such hospitals from civil liability
for such refusals.116 This conscience clause applies only to private
or non-governmental hospitals and clinics, but it prohibits all hospi-
tals and clinics “from refus[ing] an emergency admittance.”117 South
Carolina also allows medical professionals of any kind to exempt
themselves from performing or assisting in an abortion if they object
in writing.118 A medical professional does not need to give a reason
for his or her objection.119 Additionally, no medical professional can
“be dismissed, suspended, demoted, or otherwise disciplined or dis-
criminated against” because of his or her decision to not perform or
assist in an abortion.120
Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant121 involved a challenge to
the South Carolina regulations for abortion clinics in which second-
trimester or five or more first-trimester abortions are performed.122
The regulations in question were the various first-trimester require-
ments discussed above.123 After listing the various provisions in the
regulations, continuing for seven pages,124 the District Court held that
the SCDHEC regulations were unconstitutional because they violated
the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses.125 The court found
that the regulations treat abortion physicians and clinics differently
than other physicians and medical facilities by imposing requirements
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (2010).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 44-41-40.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 44-41-50(a).
119. Id.
120. S.C. CODE ANN § 44-41-50(c) (2010).
121. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1191 (2001).
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 104–107.
124. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 698–704 (D.S.C. 1999),
rev’d, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
125. Id. at 691, 744–45.
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on them that are not imposed on other medical facilities or on first-
trimester abortion providers that perform fewer than five abortions
per month.126 Most importantly for this Note, the District Court held
that because the SCDHEC put numerous unnecessary requirements
on abortion providers, they unduly burdened the fundamental right
that all women have to abortion, thus violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.127 The undue burden on women
was in the form of increased costs, delays in obtaining abortions, a de-
crease in the number of abortion clinics (resulting in the need to travel
further distances to obtain an abortion), and the possibility of unlim-
ited inspections of clinics.128 Although it was true that the abortion
clinics complied with the majority of the regulations and they were
good business practice, there were other, inseverable, regulations
that went too far.129
One of the main pieces of evidence that the court considered
was the testimony of doctors who spoke about the effect that the
regulations would have on the price of abortions.130 The court recog-
nized that the proposed regulations would “impose substantial start-
up costs upon abortion providers in th[e] state, and substantial annual
costs to maintain compliance.”131 Clinics would have no choice other
than to pass the increased price on to women seeking abortions.132
Dr. Henshaw, deputy director of research at the Alan Guttmacher
Institute in New York,133 testified that a price increase in abortions
of only twenty-five dollars can prevent one to two percent of low-
income women seeking an abortion from being able to afford one.134
Largely because of the testimony of Dr. Henshaw and other doctors,
the District Court concluded that the South Carolina regulations on
126. Id. at 742.
127. Id. at 695, 735.
128. Id. at 735–36.
129. Id. at 695. Some of the detailed regulations provide that abortion clinics must keep
their grounds free of grass and weeds, must perform fire drills every three months, and
must have a specific number and size of procedure rooms. Id. at 703.
130. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (citing testimony of Dr. Stanley
K. Henshaw made via videotaped deposition).
131. Id. at 717.
132. Id.
133. Dr. Henshaw’s job consists of conducting family planning and abortion studies.
Id. at 714.
134. Id. (citing the testimony of Dr. Stanley K. Henshaw, made via videotaped depo-
sition). At the time, an abortion cost between $325 and $480 depending on many factors,
including how far along the woman was in the pregnancy. These regulations would in-
crease the cost of abortion services at Charleston Women’s Medical Clinic, Inc. from $36.48
to $75.03, at Palmetto State Medical Center from $93.09 to $170.39, at Greenville Women’s
Clinic from $22.68 to $32.39, and at Dr. William Lynn’s Practice, from $115.67 to $367.50.
Id. at 717.
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first-trimester abortion clinics placed an unconstitutional “undue
burden”135 on a woman’s right to an abortion.136
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
finding the price increase to abortions to be incidental and modest
when considering the State’s purported purpose of protecting the
health of women137 who undergo abortions.138 Directly contrary to the
testimony of Dr. Henshaw, the court found that:
there is no evidence that the ability of any woman to obtain an
abortion or to decide to obtain an abortion would be frustrated by
these particularized costs. To conclude that any of the figures in
this case would place an obstacle in the path of a woman’s right to
choose to have an abortion would necessitate the formulation of an
arbitrary cost threshold beyond which a price increase may not
pass. This would irrationally hamstring the State’s effort to raise
the standard of care in certain abortion clinics, the procedures and
facilities of which do not adequately safeguard the health of their
patients, simply because the clinics’ performance falls so far below
appropriate norms that the expense of upgrading their practices
and equipment exceeds the arbitrarily defined amount.139
The court of appeals seemed to ignore the practical effects of what
the regulations might do, and according to Dr. Henshaw would do, to
a woman’s ability to get an abortion. Instead, the court required a
more concrete and concise showing of the effects of such regulations on
the ability of a woman to have an abortion with respect to cost.140 The
court of appeals was not satisfied with the “estimates by ‘experts’ ”
such as Dr. Henshaw.141 The court required actual “data from South
Carolina patients about the impact that particular costs had on their
decision to seek an abortion.”142 Any and all expert testimony about
the effects of the costs of the regulations was characterized as mere
anticipation, and the court stated that this “is generally not an appro-
priate basis on which to strike down statutes and regulations.”143
135. The undue burden test determines whether a state has imposed regulations that
have substantially burdened a woman’s right to an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); see infra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
136. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 695, 735.
137. Of first-trimester abortions, only one-half of one percent result in complications
requiring any kind of hospitalization or surgery. Hinkle, supra note 7.
138. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 171 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1191 (2001).
139. Id.
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This suggests that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court to
which Virginia federal cases are appealed,144 will not sustain a facial
challenge to an abortion regulation before it goes into effect as was
done in Greenville Women’s Clinic.145 Rather, the court seems to re-
quire a challenged regulation to go into effect to hear actual data
about the effects the regulation has had on the ability of a woman
to get an abortion.
Another reason the court of appeals reversed the District Court
in Greenville Women’s Clinic is that the regulations put in place
in South Carolina tracked published national medical standards
and guidelines for outpatient facilities.146 The organizations that pub-
lished these guidelines included the American Institute of Architects,
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Planned
Parenthood, and the National Abortion Federation.147 Although the
abortion clinics argued that compliance with these guidelines is not
required—they are only recommendations—and that following these
guidelines is not a necessity to improving the health of abortion
patients or the probability of a safe and successful abortion, the
court found these arguments unconvincing.148 Instead, the court found
that by following the recommendations put forth by these groups,
the SCDHEC was ensuring that abortions would be safer for the
women who undergo the procedure and would be “performed by medi-
cally competent personnel.”149 This was true even though the South
Carolina regulations exceeded the standards put forth by these vari-
ous medical groups.150 Before these regulations were put into place,
there were fourteen abortion clinics in South Carolina.151 Only three
remained after the regulations.152
D. Abortion Regulation in Other States
There are other states that have dealt with abortion regulations
which have produced effects similar to those in South Carolina. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied reasoning similar to that used
144. Official Court of Appeals Websites, FINDLAW, http://www.findlaw.com/10fedgov
/judicial/appeals_courts_sites.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
145. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 164.
146. Id. at 167–70.
147. Id. at 167.
148. Id. at 169.
149. Id. at 168 (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 430
n.12 (1983)).
150. Id. at 169.
151. Sun & Kumar, supra note 15.
152. Id.
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by the Fourth Circuit in Greenville Women’s Clinic.153 In Women’s
Medical Center of Northwest Houston v. Bell, the challenge was to a
Texas statute that required medical offices that are “used primarily for
the purpose of performing abortions” to be licensed by the State as an
abortion facility.154 Challenges to the statute were not brought under
the Due Process Clause, but instead, under the Equal Protection
Clause and the void for vagueness doctrine.155 The court held that
the regulation is proper if the regulation serves any legitimate state
goal.156 The state’s legitimate goals in this case were protecting patient
health and welfare, thus surviving a rational basis review.157
There have been some courts that have rejected the Fourth
Circuit’s reasoning in Greenville Women’s Clinic with respect to the
effect of an increased cost of abortions.158 The Ninth Circuit is one of
these courts.159 It has held that a significant increase in the cost of
abortions can constitute an undue burden on the right to have an
abortion if it affects a significant number of women.160 At issue was
a statute that required state licensing and regulation of medical facil-
ities that provide five or more first-trimester abortions per month or
any second- or third-trimester abortion.161 The evidence presented
indicated that in order to comply with the regulations, the cost to in-
dividual abortion clinics would be in the area of “tens of thousands of
dollars.”162 In order to comply, clinics would be required to purchase
cameras for ultrasound machines, hire nurses instead of medical
assistants, and pay employees overtime to make follow-up calls on
weekends.163 Because of the regulations, one abortion provider in
Arizona could have been forced to close entirely and another clinic
was at risk of losing approximately two-thirds of its physicians.164
Though the court did not decide whether the statute in question posed
an undue burden on a woman’s ability to get an abortion, the case
was remanded for more fact-finding to make a clear determination
of the increased cost to women.165
153. Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that no undue burden was imposed and that benefits sought by state justified
increased costs).
154. Id. at 413–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 413.
156. Id. at 420–21.
157. See id. at 421.
158. Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 2004).
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 536.
162. Id. at 542.
163. Id.
164. Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 542.
165. Id. at 536.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Could This Happen? Constitutional Concerns
The Virginia Supreme Court has not decided whether the
Virginia Constitution protects the right to abortion independently
from the abortion right protected under the federal Constitution.166
If the question were presented, however, it is unlikely such a right
would be recognized.167 Before Roe, the Virginia Supreme Court heard
arguments concerning convictions for abortion statute violations,
and there was no indication the prosecutions might have been un-
constitutional.168 Additionally, Virginia law has recognized the legal
rights of unborn children in other legal contexts, such as criminal
law, property law, and health care.169 If there is no independent pro-
tection of abortion under the Virginia Constitution and Roe were
overruled, the Commonwealth of Virginia would be able to freely
regulate, and even altogether prohibit, abortions. It is for these rea-
sons that analysis of this issue is based on the federal Constitution,
not the Virginia Constitution.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a woman’s
right to have an abortion is part of her right to privacy, a protected
liberty interest.170 While the right to an abortion is constitutionally
protected, it is in no way unlimited or absolute.171 States can regulate
abortion clinics reasonably and impose reasonable requirements for
a woman electing to undergo an abortion.172
In the time that abortion cases have been before the Supreme
Court, different tests have been used by the court.173 In Roe v. Wade,
166. LINTON, supra note 49, at 533.
167. Id. As of 2008, almost 25% of states had recognized a right to abortion under state
constitutions. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 538 (citing Russo v. Commonwealth, 148 S.E.2d 820 (Va. 1966); Mendoza v.
Commonwealth, 103 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1958); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 72 (Va.
1950); Coffman v. Commonwealth, 50 S.E.2d 431 (Va. 1948)).
169. Id. at 538.
170.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973). Professor B. Jessie Hill argues that U.S. courts should hold
that a woman’s right to an abortion should be protected as a right to health care, or more
specifically, “as a right to noninterference by the government with individuals’ access
to appropriate health care,” a negative right to make health care choice free from gov-
ernmental interference. B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 504 (2009). Professor Hill bases this argument not just on
U.S. law, but also on recent court decisions from Canada and South Africa: Chaoulli v.
Quebec, [2005] S.C.R. 791 (Can.), and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.). Id. at 504.
171. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54.
172. See id. at 154.
173. Compare id. (instituting a test limiting restrictions on abortions based on what
trimester of pregnancy the mother is in), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at
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the first major Supreme Court case holding that a woman has a con-
stitutional right to an abortion, the Court instituted a test in which
the right to an abortion varied depending on which of the three tri-
mesters of pregnancy the woman is in.174 In the first trimester of
pregnancy, “the attending physician, in consultation with his patient,
is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his med-
ical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”175 “If
that decision is reached, [an abortion can be performed] free of inter-
ference by the State.”176 During this time period, permissible state
regulations included licensing of physicians performing abortions and
licensing of facilities providing abortions.177 At the point between the
first and second trimester, the State begins to have an interest in the
health of the mother.178 This interest is not present during the first
trimester because at that time, an abortion is considered to be safer
for a woman than carrying the child to term and giving a live birth.179
It is after the end of the first trimester that the State can begin to
more heavily regulate abortions and abortion clinics, but only “to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health.”180 The Court found that the point be-
tween the second and third trimesters was the “compelling” point,
after which a fetus is presumably capable of life outside the womb.181
At this point in time, a state could go so far as to completely prohibit
abortions, except for when it was deemed necessary to save the life
of the mother.182
After Roe, there were many Supreme Court “cases that uncovered
difficulties in applying Roe and created widespread confusion.”183 In
1992, the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey reaffirmed that women have a constitutional right to an abor-
tion subject to limited state interference.184 However, the Court de-
parted from Roe’s trimester test and instead instituted a new test.185
A restriction on abortion is constitutional so long as it does not place
837 (affirming Roe’s underlying holding that a woman has a constitutional right to an
abortion, but overruling the trimester test and replacing it with an “undue burden” test).






180. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 163–64.
183. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1191 (2001).
184. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
185. Id. at 874.
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an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to an abortion.186 The Casey
Court defined undue burden as “the conclusion that a state regulation
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”187 This includes
unnecessary health regulations.188 Any such burden is to be weighed
against the states’ “interests . . . in protecting the health of the woman
and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”189 Many critics
argue that although Casey explicitly reaffirmed the holding in Roe
that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to an abortion,
the “undue burden” test substantially weakened this protection.190
This is the test that any current challenges to regulation of abor-
tions or abortion clinics must pass.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has already heard a case
regarding strict, detailed, hospital-like regulations on first-trimester
abortion providers.191 This is the same federal appeals court that
would hear arguments against the Virginia regulations should they
be challenged.192 The previous decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals provides an outline of how the court would decide Virginia’s
similar regulations.193 Unfortunately, there is not as clear an in-
dication regarding how the United States Supreme Court would
decide such a situation, because they denied review of the South
Carolina case.194
A determination of whether the recent Virginia regulations are
constitutional would begin with an analysis of what burdens the
regulations would place on women seeking an abortion. The most
186. Id.
187. Id. at 877.
188. Id. at 878.
189. Id. at 932 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion of Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).
190. See, e.g., EARL E. POLLOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: CASE
STUDIES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 144 (2009) (“The Casey case, which up-
held the ‘central’ abortion right, had come remarkably close to overruling Roe v. Wade.”);
Alexander, supra note 84, at 3 (“[Casey] effectively destroyed abortion rights in the United
States for all women.”); Rhonda Copelon, From Rhetoric to Reality: The Challenge of Casey,
in REFLECTIONS AFTER CASEY, supra note 84, at 9, 10 (“Casey has significantly overruled
Roe v. Wade even as it reaffirmed the right to abortion.”).
191. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 160–62 (4th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001).
192. See Official Court of Appeals Websites, supra note 144.
193. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 159.
194. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 531 U.S. 1191, 1191 (2001). In Roe, the United
States Supreme Court suggested in dicta that regulations requiring second-trimester
abortions to be performed in a hospital would be constitutional, but because of the change
to Planned Parenthood’s undue burden test, it is unknown how that issue would be decided
today. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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significant of these burdens would be increased cost of abortions and
reduction in the number of abortion clinics.195 According to testimony
in Greenville Women’s Clinic at the District Court, any increase in the
cost of an abortion, however slight, can dissuade some poorer women
from being able to get one.196 These are the same burdens that were
at issue in the South Carolina case.197
Under the Casey test, abortion regulations are to be found uncon-
stitutional if it is shown that the purpose or effect of these regulations
is to create a substantial obstacle for a woman seeking an abortion.198
If a court finds that the purpose in issuing these regulations is to
create a substantial obstacle for women wanting an abortion, then
they should obviously be struck down as unconstitutional. Assuming
this is not the purpose of the regulations, the analysis would then turn
to whether the effect of the regulations creates a substantial burden
on a woman getting an abortion.
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court addressed the effect
that price increases would have on the “undue burden” test:
Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental
effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of med-
ical care, whether for abortion or any other medical procedure.
The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed
to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it
more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot
be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation imposes
an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does
the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause.199
A modest price increase is not enough to satisfy the undue burden
test; instead the price increase must be enough to infringe on a
woman’s ability to make the decision about an abortion.200 This sug-
gests that in order for a state abortion regulation to be unconstitu-
tional, the price increase must be substantial. In Greenville Women’s
Clinic, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stressed this, noting that
a statute would be declared unconstitutional based on increased costs
195. Cella, supra note 9; Smith, supra note 6; Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion Clinics,
supra note 9.
196. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 714 (D.S.C. 1999) (citing
the testimony of Dr. Stanley K. Henshaw, made via videotaped deposition), rev’d, 222 F.3d
157 (4th Cir. 2000).
197. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 192.
198. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
199. Id. at 874.
200. See id.
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only if “in a large fraction of cases in which [it] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an
abortion.” 201 This is consistent with the Fourth Circuit requirement
of concrete evidence of the effects of rising costs on a woman’s right
to get an abortion.202 To attain such evidence, a challenge to the regu-
lation would have to wait until after the regulation is put into effect.203
After the regulation goes into effect, a woman seeking an abortion
could actually testify in court about the effect that the price of an
abortion had on her ability to get one. Such testimony would probably
require a woman who sought an abortion to state that she was not
able to get one because of the cost. It seems unnecessary to require
this for a successful constitutional challenge. It would essentially force
one or more women who desire or need an abortion to go without for
the sole purpose of securing such testimony at a trial challenging the
regulation. Based on statements in Casey and the outcome of the case
in Greenville Women’s Clinic, it is unlikely that the increased price
of abortions resulting from the regulations would have a significant
impact on a court’s decision to invalidate the regulations.204 Rather,
unless the price increase were substantial and affected a majority
of women’s decisions about abortion, it would likely be dismissed as
modest and consistent with the state’s interest in protecting the health
of the woman.205
Another basis for the challenge is the fact that the majority of
abortion clinics in Virginia could not comply with the new regulations
and would have to close.206 Abortion clinics would have to close be-
cause they would not be able to afford the changes required to meet
the structural requirements, a cost that could be as much as two mil-
lion dollars.207 The regulations require that all abortion clinics satisfy
building requirements as if they had been built in 2010, instead of
being grandfathered into earlier requirements which were in place
when they opened.208 There is a possibility that some abortion clinics
would not be able to remodel to meet the new requirements, particu-
larly if they rent their space.209 As a result of fewer abortion clinics,
201. Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 164 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S.
at 895).
202. Id.
203. See id. (noting that the Court was not able to be given data regarding impact aside
from estimates).
204. Hill, supra note 170, at 546.
205. See supra text accompanying note 200.
206. Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion Clinics, supra note 9.
207. Cella, supra note 9.
208. Salasky, supra note 23.
209. Sun & Kumar, supra note 15 (citing Laura Meyers, Chief Executive Officer of the
Falls Church Planned Parenthood clinic, who stated that the clinic rents its facility and
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women in Virginia would have to travel further to obtain an abortion.
It is estimated that such building requirements would reduce the
number of first-trimester abortion providers in the Commonwealth
from the current twenty-one to only three or four.210 It is undeniable
that having less than five abortion clinics available in the Common-
wealth would burden the ability of a woman to get an abortion, but
the question is whether this is enough to satisfy the “undue burden”
test. This is an argument that the court addressed and rejected in
Greenville Women’s Clinic.211 Again, the problem lies in providing the
court with concrete evidence that these clinics would close as a result
of the regulation and that more clinics would not open in their place.
Without that proof, there is no evidence that the regulation imposes
an undue burden.
Because neither the purpose nor effect of these regulations would
impose a “substantial burden” on the ability of a woman to get an
abortion, at least not at the level that Casey requires, the Virginia
regulations would be found constitutional.
B. Should This Happen? Practical Concerns
Many argue that, regardless of whether such regulations on first-
trimester abortions are constitutional under modern standards in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, they should not be implemented for
other reasons.212 The presence of more restrictive abortion regula-
tions in various states has had a negative impact on the number of
abortion procedures performed.213 It is not surprising that when an
abortion is more difficult to obtain, fewer abortions are performed in
a state, but this also makes it more likely that children are born who
would not have been but for the strict restrictions.214 This is in con-
trast to the effects seen previously by the legalization of abortion.215
There are many observable effects of the legalization of abortion
in the United States. Most importantly, the availability of abortion
cannot allocate funding for remodeling). The clinic performed 800 abortions and assisted
5,000 patients in 2010. Id.
210. Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion Clinics, supra note 9.
211. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 172 (4th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001) (finding that South Carolina’s new regulation made it more dif-
ficult and expensive to get an abortion but did not place an undue burden on the woman).
212. See, e.g., Hinkle, supra note 7 (declaring that the medical risks of an abortion are
low, therefore such regulations are unnecessary); Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion
Clinics, supra note 9 (quoting Tarina Keene of NARAL Pro-Choice Virginia).
213. Bisakha Sen, State Abortion Restrictions and Child Fatal-Injury: An Exploratory
Study, 73 S. ECON. J. 553, 555–56 (2007).
214. Id. at 556.
215. See id.
2012] LEGAL DOES NOT MEAN RATIONAL 417
has been associated with a decline in neonatal and infant mortality
rates.216 Convenient accessibility of abortions is also associated with
fewer births to teenagers, single women, and non-white women; fewer
children entering the adoption system; and a reduction in the reports
of child abuse and neglect.217
It is interesting to investigate the correlation between a state’s
regulation of abortion and the incidence of infant death218 to deter-
mine what effect restrictive abortion regulation has on the well-being
of the children in the state. One compilation of studies found that an
increase in abortion restrictions results in not only more infant death
by purposeful homicide, but also unintentional infant deaths.219 States
with parental consent laws220 have twenty percent more infant homi-
cides of white children.221 When there is a state on the border of the
mother’s state of residence that does not have a parental consent law,
the number of infant homicides decreases by about six percent.222
Mandatory delay requirements223 also have a correlation with infant
homicides.224 In states that have mandatory delays, infant homicides
occur approximately twenty-four percent more often to white children
and thirty percent more often to black children.225
There is also a correlation between the lack of availability of abor-
tions and increased incidence of physical abuse to children.226 This
includes abuse not only from a mother, but also from other adults,
most notably abusive boyfriends of the mother.227 These various
studies show that the more a state restricts the availability of abor-
tions, the more the children in the state suffer. This, in and of itself,
should be a strong enough argument for tightly regulated states to
lessen their restrictions on abortion, or at the very least, for states
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 554 (finding a correlation between various state abortion restrictions—
namely parental consent, mandatory delays, and a lack of public funding—and both homi-
cide and unintentional fatal injuries in young children).
219. Sen, supra note 213, at 562–63.
220. Parental consent laws are those laws that require a minor to obtain the consent
of a parent before getting an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
at 899.
221. Sen, supra note 213, at 562. “[T]he strongest predictors of infant homicide deaths
included maternal age at birth less than 17 years.” Id. at 556.
222. Id. at 562.
223. Mandatory delay laws require a pregnant woman to meet with a physician to re-
ceive information about the procedure and safety of an abortion, and then return later,
usually a different day, for the procedure to be done. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant,
222 F.3d 157, 170 (4th Cir. 2000).
224. Sen, supra note 213, at 562.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 556 (showing that legalization of abortion is associated with a decline in
teenage mothers and that younger mothers have an increased incidence of child abuse).
227. Id. at 556–57.
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like Virginia to keep abortion regulations constant and not impose
more stringent restrictions on abortion clinics.
As a practical matter, the implementation of the proposed restric-
tions would result in the closure of the majority of abortion clinics
throughout the state.228 Abortion clinics have already become pro-
gressively less available around the country, particularly for poor
and young women.229 This effect was compounded during the Bush
administration, as a result of the appointments of anti-abortion judges
and other measures meant to limit women’s access to reproductive
services.230 In the two decades from 1982 to 2001 in the United States,
the availability of abortion clinics fell by thirty-seven percent.231 If one
looks at Virginia specifically, the number of abortion clinics declined
from 1996 to 2005.232 Nationwide, the amount of women who live in
a county without a medical facility that performs abortions has in-
creased from just over one-quarter to just over one-third.233 Medical
facilities that provide abortions are present in only about thirteen
percent of all counties nationwide.234 About one-third of metropolitan
areas and almost all non-metropolitan areas in the country do not
have a single abortion provider.235 This results in women in non-
metropolitan areas being able to get an abortion at half the rate of
women in metropolitan areas.236
Of all abortions in the country done during all trimesters, only
five percent were performed in hospitals in 2000.237 Because of the lack
of abortion providers, about sixteen percent of women who had an
abortion in a nonhospital setting had to travel between fifty and one
hundred miles to obtain an abortion.238 It is estimated that eight per-
cent of women had to travel over one hundred miles.239 These per-
centages are slightly lower for women in the Middle Atlantic, where
Virginia is located, where eleven percent of women had to travel over
fifty miles.240
228. Smith, supra note 6.
229. Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, The Accessibility of Abortion Services
in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 16, 16 (2003); see also
Andrzej Kulczycki, Ethics, Ideology, and Reproductive Health Policy in the United States,
38 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 333, 333–34 (2007).
230. Kulczycki, supra note 229, at 334.
231. Henshaw & Finer, supra note 229, at 16.
232. Walker, New Abortion Clinic Rules, supra note 9.
233. Henshaw & Finer, supra note 229, at 16.
234. Id. at 22.
235. See id. at 16.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 17.
238. Id. at 18.
239. Henshaw & Finer, supra note 229, at 18.
240. Id.
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These past trends in the availability of abortion clinics will be
compounded in Virginia with the Board of Health’s regulations. If esti-
mates are correct, for a state that is over 39,500 square miles,241 it
would leave approximately only one abortion clinic per 10,000 square
miles in the state, as compared to one abortion clinic per 1,880 square
miles, as it currently stands.242 In 2010, about 25,000 abortions were
performed in Virginia.243 It is unknown during which trimester these
abortions were performed, but it is fairly safe to assume that the
vast majority of them were performed during the first trimester of
pregnancy because that is when abortions are the most accessible.244
It is safe to assume that the number of abortions in Virginia would
plummet if eighty-one percent245 of abortion clinics in the state were
to close.
In his advisory opinions, Attorney General Cuccinelli makes the
argument that these regulations on abortion clinics would lessen the
risk of complications from the procedure, particularly the risk of
“hemorrhage, cervical laceration, uterine perforation, injury to the
bowels or bladder and pulmonary complications.” 246 These are pos-
sible complications of an abortion, but they are most prevalent in
abortions that are performed in an unsafe manner, particularly those
performed in developing countries.247 The argument about improv-
ing the safety of abortions would be more compelling if abortion was
not already a fairly safe procedure. If an abortion is performed in
the eighth week of pregnancy, the risk of death is one in a million.248
Compare this to the risk of death from a colonoscopy, which is one
hundred in a million.249 “[A]bortions performed under safe conditions
241. State & County QuickFacts: Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts
.census.gov/qfd/states/51000.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
242. Compare id. (stating that Virginia is approximately 39,000 square miles), with
Walker, Va. Can Regulate Abortion Clinics, supra note 9 (recognizing that there would be
only approximately three or four abortion clinics left out of the current total of 21 clinics).
243. Sun & Kumar, supra note 15.
244. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127 (2010) (giving the Virginia Board of Health the
responsibility for regulating first-trimester abortions), with id. § 18.2-73 (2010) (describing
the General Assembly restrictions on abortions performed during the second trimester
of pregnancy).
245. See Smith, supra note 6 (explaining that 17 out of 21 clinics would close as a result
of implementing the regulations).
246. 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 10-012, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Eric R. Strasburg,
Abortion, in MANUAL OF CLINICAL PROBLEMS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 6 (Michael
E. Rivlin & Rick W. Martin eds., 4th ed. 1994)).
247. Janie Benson, Evaluating Abortion-Care Programs: Old Challenges, New Directions,
36 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 189, 189 (2005).
248. Klein, supra note 27.
249. Id.
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have a very low rate of complications,” 250 and are considered to be very
reliable.251 It is estimated that worldwide, forty-six million women
undergo an abortion each year.252 Over 1.3 million of these women
are in the United States.253 There are approximately three million un-
planned pregnancies each year in the United States and about half
of those result in an abortion.254 This is a procedure that is performed
everyday throughout the country.255 The safety of abortions is high-
lighted by the fact that the people who know the most about the pro-
cedure, physicians, are quick to turn to abortion to end an unwanted
pregnancy.256 There is no need to further regulate abortion clinics to
try to make the procedure safer when it is already safe.
In developed countries where women have good access to a safe
abortion, “abortion is far less likely than an injection of penicillin
to cause death; the comparative risk of death from abortion at 16
weeks or earlier is one-seventh of that related to pregnancy and
childbirth.” 257 It is estimated that only one in one hundred thousand
women undergoing a safe abortion die from the procedure.258 A
woman is much more likely to be harmed by an illegal abortion than
by a legal one because the fatality rate for illegal abortions, performed
by an unqualified individual or when the care received is substandard,
is about seventy times higher than for a legal abortion.259 It is esti-
mated that the risk of death from an unsafe abortion varies between
one in one hundred and one in one thousand.260 Concerns about a
woman’s safety during the abortion procedure must come from this
misinformation or misunderstanding about the safety of legal abor-
tions versus illegal abortions: “whereas virtually all legal abortions are
safe, the vast majority of illegal abortions are unsafe.” 261 As a conse-
quence of the holding in Roe, after which many states had to change
their abortion regulations to make abortion legal and more accessible,
250. Benson, supra note 247, at 189.
251. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973); Benson, supra note 247, at 189.
252. Benson, supra note 247, at 189.
253. Kulczycki, supra note 229, at 338.
254. Id.
255. See id. (recognizing the widespread use of abortions and noting there are 1.3 million
abortions performed in the United States each year alone).
256. See ANÍBAL FAÚNDES & JOSÉ BARZELATTO, THE HUMAN DRAMA OF ABORTION: A
GLOBAL SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS 71 (2006) (“[A]lmost 80 percent of the unwanted preg-
nancies that occurred in female physicians themselves or in the partners of male physicians
had ended in abortion.”).
257. Kulczycki, supra note 229, at 339 (citation omitted).
258. FAÚNDES & BARZELATTO, supra note 256, at 21.
259. Hannah Brown, Abortion Round the World, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 1018, 1018 (2007).
260. FAÚNDES & BARZELATTO, supra note 256, at 36.
261. Id. at 138.
2012] LEGAL DOES NOT MEAN RATIONAL 421
there was a ninety-four percent decline in the number of deaths, from
251 to fourteen, in a decade.262 Most unsafe abortions occur in coun-
tries that legally restrict abortions.263 It should not be surprising that
the prohibition of abortions does not always dissuade women from
undergoing the procedure, but instead pushes them to undergo illegal,
unsafe procedures;264 this is consistent with other legal restrictions,
such as Prohibition in the United States.265
A 2006 study of medical facilities that perform abortions showed
that at the majority of such centers, pregnant teenagers were told
of medical risks, including suicide, sterility, and breast cancer, that
are not actually linked to safe abortions.266 This leads to women who
are considering an abortion worrying about risks that are not pres-
ent as a result of the procedure, denying them the right to make an
informed choice.267 All of these statistics show that first-trimester
abortions are already safe and there is no reason to impose regula-
tions that would impede a woman’s ability to get an abortion under
the guise of making them safer.
Approximately three-fourths of women pay for an abortion with
their own money or with money that they get from a family member
or friend, rather than through an insurance provider.268 Because of
the need to save money for an abortion, many abortions for women
who might need them the most become delayed, even while those
women do not have enough money to even raise the child.269 As a
woman gets further into her pregnancy, getting an abortion poses
more risks to the woman270 and an abortion gets progressively more
expensive.271 These facts strongly suggest that lowering restrictions
on early abortions, or at the very least, keeping regulations constant,
would benefit those women who most need them: women who cannot
afford to raise a child and who would be hurt the most by an increase
262. COLIN FRANCOME & MARCEL VEKEMANS, ABORTION: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE
139 (2007).
263. FAÚNDES & BARZELATTO, supra note 256, at 21.
264. See id. (“Most unsafe abortions are performed in countries where they are legally
restricted.”).
265. See DRUGS AND SOCIETY: U.S. PUBLIC POLICY 48 (Jefferson M. Fish ed., 2006)
(stating that Prohibition, and the prohibition of drugs in general, increased the use and
availability of stronger and more dangerous drugs).
266. Kulczycki, supra note 229, at 339.
267. Id.
268. Henshaw & Finer, supra note 229, at 20.
269. See id. at 23.
270. David A. Grimes, Second-Trimester Abortions in the United States, 16 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 260, 262 (1984) (“The two most important determinants of the risk of complications
from abortion are gestational age and the abortion method used. In general, the earlier the
abortion is performed, the safer it is.” (citation omitted)).
271. Henshaw & Finer, supra note 229, at 18.
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in the price of an abortion. These same women who cannot afford to
raise a child would benefit in another way: on average, the cost of a
safe abortion, performed early in pregnancy, costs less than delivery
of a child.272
CONCLUSION
Virginia Attorney General Cuccinelli started the ball rolling fast.
Within a year, the hospital-like regulation of abortion clinics has gone
from suggestion to implementation by the Virginia Board of Health.273
Although the first-trimester abortion clinic regulations would likely
be found constitutional by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,274 and
probably by the United States Supreme Court,275 it would be unwise,
as a policy matter, to impose the regulations.
As a constitutional matter, the first-trimester regulations on
abortion would be constitutional because of the weakening of the
constitutional protection of abortion by Casey and because of the lack
of concrete evidence about the effects of the regulation. The purpose
of these regulations would not be to impose burdens on women seek-
ing abortions, but to protect their health and safety when undergoing
an abortion.276 It is necessary to inquire about the effects of these
regulations. Because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has seemed
to require concrete evidence about these risks,277 a constitutional chal-
lenge would fail to prove that the effect of the regulations was to cause
a substantial burden on women wanting to undergo an abortion, de-
spite the increased costs.
Although the regulations would be found constitutional, there re-
main reasons why they should not be implemented. These regulations
would lead to a decrease in abortion clinics in the Commonwealth.278
In fact, anti-abortion groups have called these regulations “a signifi-
cant pro-life victory” because they are so stringent.279 The lack of
272. FAÚNDES & BARZELATTO, supra note 256, at 39.
273. See Cella, supra note 9 (noting that in 2010 Attorney General Cuccinelli issued
an opinion on abortion clinics); Salasky, supra note 23 (stating that the Virginia Board of
Health approved the regulations in 2011).
274. Salasky, supra note 23.
275. See supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
276. See Grimes, supra note 270, at 262–63 (finding that earlier abortions are safer,
and even though a small percentage of abortions are performed in the second trimester,
they account for about half of abortion-related deaths).
277. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1101 (2001).
278. Smith, supra note 6.
279. Sabrina Tavernise, Virginia Health Board Tightens Rules on Abortion Clinics,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/us/virginia-panel-tightens
-abortion-clinic-rules.html?_r=1 (quoting the Family Foundation, an anti-abortion group).
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availability of abortion clinics to women has been linked to increases
in infant homicides, in children born to teenagers, and in children
entering the adoption system.280 If the purpose is to protect citizens,
then imposing these stringent requirements on abortion clinics will
not have the desired effect. Making these regulations to protect women
who undergo abortions,281 a procedure that is already considered to
be safe with the precautions currently in place,282 would harm other,
more vulnerable members of the community: children.283
Although it is unlikely that a constitutional challenge in the
Fourth Circuit would be successful, this will probably not stop groups
from trying to challenge the regulations. The Centre for Reproductive
Rights has already said that they will consider action regarding
these regulations.284
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